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“Why did I laugh tonight? No voice will tell: 
No god, no demon of severe response, 
Deigns to reply from heaven or from hell. 
Then to my human heart I turn at once— 
Heart! thou and I are here sad and alone; 
Say, wherefore did I laugh? O mortal pain! 
O darkness! darkness! ever must I moan, 
To question heaven and hell and heart in vain!” 
—John Keats, “Why did I laugh tonight? No voice will tell”  
 4 
Introduction: Sex and Style in Berryman’s Time 
 One major issue a writer encounters in attempting to introduce a study of John 
Berryman is that, as Charles Thornbury wrote in the introduction to Berryman’s collected 
poems, “There are many John Berrymans.”1 Born John Allyn Smith, Jr., on October 25, 
1914, in McAlester, Oklahoma, Berryman was endlessly in motion throughout his life, 
picked up and relocated variously in Oklahoma, and finally landing in Clearwater, Florida. 
Berryman’s father, following a falling out with Berryman’s mother and bankruptcy, his 
father, as Berryman wrote, “very early in the morning,/rose with his gun and went outdoors 
by my window,/and did what was needed,”2 allegedly committing suicide.  
 Among the many burdens Berryman hoisted in his life, the loss of his father was only 
one. This essay examines, with some depth, a different burden—Berryman’s attitude towards 
the philosophical problem of desire. Berryman became an adult and a poet in what Alan 
Petigny refers to as a “Permissive Society,” America between the forties and seventies. 
Situated within a culture in transition, Berryman was located in the midst of a society 
pushing against the moral constraints of the past. Part of a concerted effort being made within 
popular media and literature, Berryman tried to find a language for speaking openly about 
sex.  
Petigny argues that the divide in the popular imagination between “the nominally 
conservative fifties and the socially liberal sixties” is false, “bad fiction, not fact and certainly 
not history”3. Rather, in his study, he makes “the case for the dramatic liberalization of 
values during the Truman and Eisenhower years,” marking “the emergence of a Permissive 
                     
1
 Thornbury, Charles. Introduction. Collected Poems 1937-1971. By John Berryman. 1989. 1st ed. New 
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. xvii-lix. Print. Hereafter, Thornbury. 
2
 Berryman, John. “145.” The Dream Songs. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1969. 162, Print. 
Hereafter, DS.  
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 Petigny, Alan Cecil. The Permissive Society: America, 1941-1965. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009. 2. Print. Hereafter, Petigny.  
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Turn,” which “constituted an unprecedented challenge to moral constraints” (Petigny 3). 
Berryman’s poetry would take part in this challenge to the inherited cultural morality—not 
by uttering vulgarities for shock-value, but using his subjective experiences of desire as a 
source for his poetic-philosophical meditations upon the morality, pleasure, suffering, and 
humor revolving around sex. 
 Berryman’s intense play with language and style were integral to the process of finding 
a voice for his poetic representations of desire. The layers of opacity under which Berryman 
buried vulgarity in his writing are partly the product of a time defined by a tension between 
“exploding levels of premarital sex” and the overpowering “public inhibitions… that helped 
obscure” (Petigny 121) that sexual explosion: 
As informal codes that are enforced by ‘fear of external nonlegal sanctions,’ social 
norms tend to be durable. In other words, unlike the products of the popular culture, 
social norms do not bend easily to transient tastes or the latest fads. (Petigny 122) 
 
The problem was a silence on the matter of sex. Petigny quotes Lynn Ferrin, who commented 
that in the sixties, “people were not open about their sex lives… Nobody was a virgin but 
nobody admitted it” (Petigny 122). The lack of any idiom for the easy expression of issues of 
sex and desire seems to have been a major cultural constraint in what was nonetheless an era 
of exploding sexual activity. What this dilemma amounts to, then, is an issue of language as 
much as an issue of morality—a question of how, using what words and tone, sex and desire 
can take on poetic representation.  
 Berryman was no exception to this problem. A passage in E.M. Halliday’s memoir, 
John Berryman and The Thirties4, gives a glimpse into Berryman’s own struggles with 
                     
4
 Halliday, E.M. John Berryman and the Thirties: A Memoir. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1987. Print. Hereafter, Halliday.  
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discussing sex, though a decade prior to the Permissive Era Petigny isolates. Berryman’s 
adolescence, Halliday confirms, unfolded in an even more inhibited era: 
John and I confided almost everything to each other, but we were reticent on the 
subject of just how far we had progressed in our efforts to become sexual veterans. 
We resisted the male tendency to hyperbolize, feeling that to lie to your best friend 
was on a level with kicking your mother downstairs. The alternative was a vague 
suggestiveness that allowed us each to suppose the other was doing pretty well 
(Halliday 20). 
 
Not only was sex a matter of great interest to the undergraduate Berryman, it was also a 
difficult subject about which to speak, even with his closest friend. As significant is the fact 
that the two friends were incapable of discussing their sexual shortcomings. Sex and sexual 
desire, then, posed an obstacle to language and expression, making it a ripe topic for a 
budding poet.  
 Along with the cultural constraints under which Berryman explored issues of sex and 
vice, Berryman found himself also within a particularly stifling poetic climate.  In an article 
Berryman wrote for The Partisan Review, entitled “Waiting For The End, Boys,”5 Berryman 
described the climate in which poetry found itself around 1935, “the Auden climate.” About 
this era, Berryman claims, “Poetry became ominous, flat, and social; elliptical and 
indistinctly allusive; casual in tone and form, frightening in import” (Berryman 254). What 
Berryman lamented was, primarily, Auden’s overwhelming and oppressive influence, 
referring to it as “Auden Ltd. (Inc. I should perhaps say)” (Berryman 255).  
As disturbing as Auden’s presence was the lack of any alternative influences. Berryman 
disparaged the absence of any presences that veered away from this influence. “The young 
poets lately, in short,” Berryman argued, “have had not fathers but grandfathers”—or, in 
other words, following Auden, nothing new emerged in poetry to open up “fresh avenues” 
                     
5
 Berryman, John. “Waiting For The End, Boys.” The Partisan Review. February, 1948: Volume XV, 
Number 2: 254-267. Hereafter, Berryman.  
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for young poet. What he longs for is something equivalent to the “revolutions by which a 
poetry is diverted from its course to a new course” (Berryman 262), a way “out of the 
Climate,” which is what the title of the article implies.  
 Berryman was a poet developing, with great self-awareness, within this very Auden 
climate. This essay attempts to track, in some respect, Berryman’s experimentations with 
poetic language, which were perhaps part of a process—Berryman breaking away from the 
climate that produced him. Through risks taken within his language and his life, Berryman 
found a distinct voice for representations of his own experience, becoming, in a sense, his 
own poetic “father.” Having only grandfathers, it was necessary for Berryman to take on the 
issue of his voice headfirst, and based on the general surprise of critics and scholars, there 
seems to have been very little precedent for what Berryman achieved. 
 Even now, Berryman seems to stand as an anomaly, a figure of interest in my eyes 
because of his incongruity with contemporary literary theory—particularly, Roland Barthes’ 
“Death of the Author,” in which Barthes argues that, through writing, the author enters into 
his own “death,” and his text becomes a composite of various cultural and political forces. 
The relation between the two is not directly either a conflict or harmony; it is, in a way, both. 
This essay approaches Berryman’s writing as a site in which the poet transformed his own 
experiences through the mechanisms of poetry into something entirely different, lighter, less 
painful, less essentially real. To the extent that “John Berryman,” an actual person, wrote the 
texts examined in this essay, Berryman himself would agree that the personality in the poems 
is not precisely the actual individual that architected the texts.  
 The poetically constructed myth of John Berryman is not the equivalent of the man that 
wrote the poems. Neither is the myth of John Berryman as interpreted in this essay. The John 
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Berryman that this essay constructs based on the readings of the few poems analyzed is 
precisely not the author—but rather, a personality, a literary construction, artfully created and 
maintained, bearing some relation to Berryman’s experience but not the man himself. In that 
sense, despite the fact that this essay does attempt to re-create John Berryman—his attitudes 
towards desire and poetry—it is also aware, as Berryman was, that the personality through 
which the poems emerged was not an essential authorial identity, but rather a figure 
assembled within the text. Berryman embodies an ambivalent space, a poet who actively 
sought to create a life for himself in his art, yet also to dissociate that life from any living 
individual named John Berryman—the prime example of which is the semi-pseudonym of 
Henry in The Dream Songs.  
 With that in mind, the essay draws on the facets of Berryman’s poetry—syntax, for 
example—in order to demonstrate that, throughout his life, Berryman’s writing was a site in 
which the poet attempted to attain what Italo Calvino has referred to as lightness6. Weighed 
down both by cultural constraints on sex and the oppressive weight of Auden Inc., Berryman 
was forced to find a poetic voice through which both language and sex could shed weight. In 
doing so, Berryman not only challenged cultural norms, but also found a voice in which these 
difficult topics could be expressed with humor and pleasure. Calvino’s conception of 
lightness, which provides a framework for considering a relationship between style and 
existential conditions, argues for the use of literature to escape the “slow petrification” of the 
world. Two paths are available to the writer seeking lightness. First, it can be achieved 
through language itself by creating a lightness of style, and, second, it can be created through 
the writer’s way of seeing, i.e. using literature to “look at the world from a different 
                     
6
 Calvino, Italo. Six Memos for the Next Millenium. New York: Vintage Books. 1993. Print. Hereafter, 
Calvino.  
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perspective, with a different logic” (Calvino 14). Berryman, whose understanding of the 
poem, this essay will demonstrate, bears some similarity to Calvino’s existential view of 
literature.  
 The essay is divided into four chapters, which examine Berryman’s output in a linear 
trajectory, selectively analyzing poems with relevance to issues pertaining to desire and style. 
Chapter One focuses on Berryman’s first book, The Dispossessed, in particular a poem 
entitled “The Statue,” establishing Berryman’s understanding of desire. Chapter Two shifts 
to Sonnets To Chris, a poem-diary Berryman wrote about his first extramarital affair, 
examining the way in which Berryman’s personal experience with desire resulted in a 
stylistic evolution, an injection of passion and intensity into his language. Chapter Three 
moves on to The Dream Songs, particularly Songs 1 and 4, paying particular attention to the 
role of humor in revealing the function of desire. 
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I: Seeing Berryman in “The Statue” 
 The statue, tolerant through years of weather, 
 Spares the untidy Sunday throng its look, 
 Spares shopgirls knowledge of the fatal pallor 
 Under their evening color, 
 Spares homosexuals, the crippled, the alone, 
 Extravagant perception of their failure; 
 Looks only, cynical, across them all 
 To the delightful Avenue and its lights.7 
 
 John Berryman’s early poetry, though lacking in the bizarre sounds of his puzzling long 
poem The Dream Songs, sets the stage for the explorations he was to undertake in most of his 
literary output. “The Statue,” the second poem in his first book, The Dispossessed, introduces 
the theme, a major Berryman concern, into which I will be conducting my own journey. In 
this essay, the particular concern of Berryman’s is referred to as “the problem of desire.” 
Desire, based on Berryman’s own depiction of it in “The Statue,” is a nebulous term, 
referring to the overarching metaphysical concept—i.e. the fact that humans are creatures of 
appetite, existing in a condition of desire, the object of which varies.  
 The reading of “The Statue” given in this chapter is presented as opposed to a trend in 
Berryman scholarship to portray the early Berryman as a mindless disciple of Auden and 
Yeats, epitomized by Adam Kirsch’s chapter on Berryman in The Wounded Surgeon: 
Confession and Transformation in Six American Poets8. This chapter demonstrates that, as 
early as The Dispossessed, Berryman had a vision for the aim of his poetic output, appearing 
quite clearly in “The Statue.” Berryman, in “The Statue,” committed himself to being a poet 
                     
7
 Berryman, John. “The Statue.” Collected Poems 1937-1971. Ed. Charles Thornbury. New York: Farrar, 
Straus, Giroux, 1989. 4. Print. Hereafter, CP.  
8
 Kirsch, Adam. The Wounded Surgeon: Confession and Transformation in Six American Poets. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2005. Print. Hereafter, Kirsch.  
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whose artwork would treat human imperfection9 as its main subject, in a mindful rejection of 
art’s tendency to immortalize that which is considered great and virtuous. Like the critics 
alongside whom this essay analyzes “The Statue,” Berryman is treated as a presence within 
the poem; the text stands in as Berryman, as a constructed literary myth.  
 A desire for eminence was certainly part of Berryman’s poetic inspiration. The error in 
Kirsch’s logic is to translate this desire into a defining quality of the early period’s poetic 
output. In Kirsch’s analysis, Berryman’s desire “‘to be’ Yeats” (Kirsch 103) was the sole 
purpose for “The Statue.” To impose this reading onto the poem is equivalent to transforming 
Berryman’s poetry into the kind of meaningless statue Berryman himself attempts to reject 
through the poem. Kirsch proposed that Berryman “raises himself up to a Yeatsian height, 
and then finds himself with nothing to say”; the statue in the poem of Alexander Van 
Humboldt, which stands in Central Park, supposedly serves as “an emblem of his aspiration” 
(106). Kirsch’s Berryman believed himself to be a man worthy of statuesque immortality, 
arrogant enough to believe that fame eludes him only because of “the brute ignorance of the 
average man” (107).   Essentially, Kirsch posited that Berryman was using the poem as a 
means of constructing a false image himself as an eminent, heroic poet, one who attributed 
his lack of fame to the apish intelligence of society at large.   
 J.M. Linebarger, in his book-length study of Berryman, suggested as well that 
Berryman identifies with the statue. Linebarger’s understanding of Berryman is that, for the 
poet, the statue symbolizes “not only a cynical awareness and resignation but also a kind of 
aristocratic pride that the poet shares”10 (Linebarger 31)11. Kirsch implies that The 
                     
9
 Berryman’s notion of human imperfection is also nebulous, but desire proves itself to be central. 
Perfection, it seems, meant for Berryman a state of absolute satisfaction and possession, in opposition to 
which desire becomes a mark of imperfection—dissatisfaction, dispossession.  
10
 Linebarger, J.M. John Berryman. New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc. 1974. Print. Hereafter, Linebarger 
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Dispossessed is “apprentice work” (Kirsch 106), and negligible in that regard, because 
nothing of import is communicated. But, though Berryman’s tone, in some respect, manages 
to  “maintain an attitude of proud superiority” (Kirsch 108) towards the human figures in his 
poems, I will argue in this section that Berryman was, in fact, setting the stage for the major 
works that would follow. Beginning with “The Statue,” Berryman positioned himself as an 
artist whose poetry would grapple with that which, in his mind, had been traditionally 
“dispossessed,” abandoned by art—human imperfection, part of which is the problem of 
desire.   
 Berryman thought of himself, it seems, as more of an “insignificant dreamer” than a 
great poet. The clearest articulation of Berryman’s artistic intent lies in the final stanza, 
which Kirsch ignores.  Linebarger’s analysis puts forth that, in that last stanza, Berryman 
imagined himself as the “insignificant dreamer” in a dark apartment, who “will close his 
eyes/Mercifully on the expensive drama/Wherein he wasted so much skill, such faith,/And 
salvaged less than the intolerable statue” (CP 4). These four lines reveal a posture of artistic 
insecurity, refuting directly the argument that Berryman at the time was an obviously 
disdainful and arrogant figure.  
 The myth of himself that Berryman created in “The Statue” was that of a poet 
sacrificing his skill for the hopeful attempt at immortalizing and elevating humanity’s flaws. 
Berryman’s artistic insecurity, present in “The Statue,” rested in the anxious depiction of the 
dreamer, whose commitment to creating the poetry of human imperfection is depicted as a 
potential waste of his craftsmanship. By focusing on the “dispossessed,” Berryman 
“salvaged” the discarded refuse of society, figures of minimal importance in relation to the 
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 It is telling that this essay has to refer to an analysis of Berryman’s poetry from 1974 in order to find any 
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venerated men idolized in statues. Berryman understood that, in doing so, he was taking the 
risk of spoiling his “skill” and “faith,” of misdirecting his poetic attention. But, noting 
specifically that Berryman considered the dreamer’s poetic focus as a means of salvaging the 
socially discarded, he seems also to have believed that his sacrifice, so to speak, was a form 
of salvation, a way of immortalizing and redeeming the flawed presences.  
 Furthermore, the statue is far from an object with which Berryman identifies. As a 
symbol for the work of art, Berryman argues for the insignificance of its content—the “great 
man” whose relevance has faded—but also confirms the enduring physical form of the work 
of art as its undeniable virtue. In light of this, Berryman’s own poem veers away from this 
irrelevant concern with figures of great achievement, focused instead upon the very 
disfigurement ignored by the statue. Berryman constructs his poem in his vision of what 
might constitute the new, immortal statue—a statue whose product is a rigid, heavy elevation 
of the culturally and socially dispossessed into figures of immense importance. In uniting the 
living presences with the statue, through a common ground of “ruin” and “disfigurement,” 
Berryman proposes imperfection as the immortal topic that transcends life’s transience, art’s 
immortality, and time’s nullification of achievement. 
 Kirsch is right to suggest, though, that Berryman ultimately fails in making the figures 
of life seem like objects of any importance; Berryman suffered from an inability, in the 
poem, to differentiate between disdain for, and critique of, the living. However, the poem did 
foreground the problem of desire. It is through this particular philosophical meditation on 
desire that Berryman manages to elevate the figures of the homeless into symbols within a 
complicated discussion of a metaphysical issue. Through the symbol of the homeless, 
Berryman raises the desire issue, transforming the dispossessed into a metaphor for human 
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imperfection—the suffering engendered by need. Berryman’s tone, however, is the reason for 
the poem’s stylistic failure, as he adopts an excessive formal rigidity in an attempt to provide 
the symbolic homeless with the kind of importance that the statue’s stony pride provides 
Humboldt. Kirsch mistakes Berryman’s “tone of greatness”—dubbed “Yeatsian 
grandiloquence” by Randall Jarell—as an implicit identification with the indifferent, haughty 
statue.12 But the tone is more of a stylistic matter, an attempt at recreating the physical 
contours of the statue, whose endurance and immortality Berryman upholds, not the 
insignificance of its subject matter.  
 “The Statue” puts forth the problem of desire by transforming the human presences into 
metaphors, each one representing a particular facet integral to the problem. Berryman 
ultimately does not distance himself entirely from the human, but attempts to place himself in 
close proximity. By positioning the “I” amongst the homeless awakening in the park, 
Berryman positions himself within the human, a symbolic statement of investment in the 
very human reality that the statue scorns: 
Where I sit, near the entrance to the Park, 
The charming dangerous entrance to their need, 
Dozens, a hundred men have lain till morning 
And the preservative darkness waning, 
Waking to want, to the day before, desire 
For the ultimate good, Respect, to hunger waking; 
Like the statue ruined but without its eyes; 
Turned vaguely out at dawn for a new day.  
 
After positioning himself within the human, Berryman uses the problem of desire to bring the 
three different symbols of the poem into a philosophical dynamic. Embodying the problem of 
desire, the homeless find themselves “waking to want”; Desire is, in this case, the driving life 
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force, the condition that animates humanity towards satisfaction in various forms. It is, on the 
one hand, a state of physical need—“hunger” and sexual “desire”; on the other hand, through 
a clever line break, Berryman also posits that desire can be satisfied through the achievement 
of “the ultimate good, Respect.”  
 The homeless are not only embodiments of the ambivalent possibilities through which 
desire can be satisfied. The coexistence of physical hunger and desire for respect is 
accompanied by the fact that, because of their constitutional hunger, the homeless are blind 
and “ruined.” The immediate awakening into desire places the homeless in an existential 
condition of mindless need, which is a cause of suffering. In other words, the problem of 
desire is its enigmatic contradiction. Identified in the poem as the driving life-force that leads 
to either pleasure or achievement, the homeless are examples of the way in which this same 
life-force can, when unquenched, result in a condition of suffering—of rejection, of isolation, 
all of which follows from an inability to receive respect.  
 Next, Berryman introduces the symbolic “lovers,” who act as a paradigm of a particular 
means of desire-satisfaction. In their presence as being within a love-relationship, the lovers 
are emblematic of desire satisfied through physical means—specifically, affection and 
sexuality. The purpose of the symbolic lovers within the poem is to express that this 
particular form of satisfying desire is inadequate due to its transience. Berryman directly 
points out that the lovers’ walks are “shortly to be over.” The inadequacy of pleasure runs 
through the stanza: 
The sound of water cannot startle them 
Although their happiness runs out like water, 
Of too much sweetness the expected drain. 
They trust their Spring; they have not seen the statue. 
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Berryman’s gaze upon the lovers is concerned with a knowledge of their transience, to which 
they themselves seem unaware. The lovers’ mistake is to trust the blooming life of “their 
Spring,” ignoring the fact that this is a temporary state from which life necessarily fades.   
 This dismissal of physical satisfaction is further evident from Berryman’s description of 
the lovers in stanza six. Unlike the eyes of the statue, which distinguish it and endow it with 
“pride,” the lovers’ “glancing” is as thoughtless as their physical gratification. “If they glance 
up, they glance in passing,/An idle outcome of that pacing/That never stops, and proves them 
animal.” Berryman reduces the lovers to a subhuman bestiality. The body, the site of 
physical-sexual pleasure, Berryman describes in similarly mindless terms, conveying 
embodiment as a burden: “These thighs breasts pointed eyes are not their choosing,/But blind 
insignia by which are known/Season, excitement, loosed upon this city.” The body is not 
only transient, but uncontrollable and “blind,” and its mode of satisfying desire through 
pleasure is the result of a thoughtless instinct, rather than a more focused and thoughtful form 
of satisfaction.  
 In the world of “The Statue,” “disfigurement is general.” The homeless, the lovers, and 
even the statue are “ruined,” each carrying time’s blemish. The statue, symbolic of desire 
satisfied through “the ultimate good, Respect,” this chapter has already established as being 
flawed. “Since graduating from its years of flesh,” Berryman says, “The name has faded in 
the public mind.” The key, however, is that it has transcended the transient satisfaction of the 
flesh, but only by virtue of its entry into the shell of formal art, not necessarily because 
achievement is a more valid means of satisfying desire. Nonetheless, Berryman does uphold 
“the ultimate good, Respect,” above physical-sexual pleasure, but the statue’s cultural 
irrelevance is understood as a problem in the poem. Ultimately pessimistic, “The Statue” 
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fails to finally find a serviceable escape from the contradiction of desire. Only the prideful 
shell of the work of art, its formal manifestation, is “tolerant” to the destructive motions of 
time.  
 The problem of desire, then, that Berryman has put forth in “The Statue” is that desire 
is a necessary condition of suffering. Necessary, that is, because desire is the life-force that 
drives human activity, a suffering that leads to pleasure. That pleasure, moreover, can take on 
a variety of forms—a transient, physical, sexual pleasure, which “The Statue” dismisses, and 
the immortality found within the shell of a work of art, which can only fade in meaning 
though not in appearance. The desire problem is to remain a constant throughout this essay, 
but Berryman’s attitude would undergo significant changes.  
 Having placed himself within a meditation upon human imperfection, and having made 
it the subject of his artistic focus, Berryman, in “The Statue,” began what was to be his long-
term poetic enterprise. While Berryman positioned himself as a poet of human imperfection, 
he also failed to evoke any sign of life within the poem. “The Statue” is, ultimately, a poem 
that reads like, fittingly, a statue—with sonic weight, grandiloquence, and rigidity. His 
attempt to create poetry that “immortalizes” that which is human cannot be sustained solely 
through a posture, a statement of intent, or a convincing philosophical position. Were it 
sufficiently evocative to balance various concepts through argument—if only poems could be 
essays—then Berryman would have had a fantastic piece on his hands. In part, the absence of 
vigor in the poem is a result of the style, but it also relates to Berryman’s misuse of 
perspective; the poem uses both first- and third-person, but neither is made to function to its 
fullest potential. The first person only vaguely speaks for Berryman’s experience, and even 
then it maintains a distance, remains, as Linebarger correctly claims, “impersonal and aloof” 
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(31). Berryman’s third-person voice does not radically shape the perspective in any 
significant way either, often relying on meditation and reflection to articulate its 
interpretations of a symbol.  
 The style, though, is also part of the poem’s failure to make life felt. “The Statue” 
demonstrates the shortcomings of Berryman’s early adherence to monotonous syntax. I 
isolate this as a trait of much of Berryman’s early poems, but certainly not all of them, and 
also in a relative sense; even Berryman’s most experimental early poetry pales in comparison 
to the wild modulations of his sonnets and songs. The first stanza of “The Statue,” for 
example, is characterized by the clarity of its expression. At no point does Berryman 
“crumple” the syntax, as he would begin to do in the Sonnets. In terms of craftsmanship, 
then, Berryman resembles a sculptor; his understanding of the poem seems to have been that 
the aim of the poet was to “immortalize” its subject in a language as rigid, as heavy, as 
marble and stone. As a result, there is a slowness to the pace at which the stanza can be read, 
as though the language itself were a weight. This effect is achieved not only by its monotony, 
but also by the very structure of the sentence, which overuses of the interrupting modifying 
phrase:  
The statue, tolerant through years of weather,  
Spares the untidy Sunday throng its look, 
Spares shopgirls knowledge of the fatal pallor 
Under their evening colour, 
Spares homosexuals, the crippled, the alone, 
Extravagant perception of their failure; 
Looks only, cynical, across them all 
To the delightful Avenue and its lights. 
 
The most musical moment, the last two lines, despite the use of a syntactical quirk to isolate 
the word “cynical,” is not a radical enough variation to create any dynamic tension with the 
unbearably uninflected droning that anticipates it.  
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 Before being able to fully convey the intensity of human experience, while also 
refracting it through transformative masks, Berryman would have to be immersed more fully 
in life experiences that called into question his philosophical stance on desire. It was to be his 
intense experience with passion’s dual-edged sword—pleasure and suffering—that would 
force him to find a language for the expression of exuberance and desperation.  And it would 
require a major personal and poetic failure for Berryman to understand that, though poetry 
can place a reassuring mask on painful experiences, it cannot fully transform one’s existential 
conditions.  
 This chapter ends now by proposing a refutation to the argument established, which has 
been that, based on “The Statue,” the early Berryman had no stylistic means of accessing the 
intensity he would later cultivate in his language. This is untrue, in some respect. The reality 
of the situation is that Berryman was unable to bring to bear any sign of vigor in poems that 
openly incorporated his own personal presence. “The Statue,” a poem that meditates on 
Berryman’s own conception of himself as a poet, lacks the intensity that would later 
characterize Berryman’s voice. There is, however, a powerful sequence of poems in The 
Dispossessed that, in contrast, shows signs of the intensity that was to infect the musical 
songs and sonnets to follow—The Nervous Songs. One of these Songs in particular brings 
together well both the theme of desire and Berryman’s already-dormant experimental 
impulse—“Young Woman’s Song”. The awkwardly crumpled syntax is a “nervous” 
language, conveying an intense anxiety. While his later experimentations, though sonically 
similar, were more invested in the passionate and the comic, the fact that these early 
instances of altered syntax are intended to be “nervous” implies that Berryman’s anxiety 
about desire was itself a source of intensity early on.  
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 The poem itself is about a young woman in a bath, reflecting on desire and lust, 
plagued by the anxiety of indecision and self-reproach. “The round and smooth, my body in 
my bath,/If someone else would like to too” (CP 49). Desire for the desire of the other 
animates the woman’s thought, and drives her towards longing for some form of human 
relationship. However, she expresses a hatred for her body as well, in part because she is 
deprived of the intimacy it demands. “I hate this something like a bobbing cork/Not going. I 
want something to hang to.” The attitude towards desire conveyed in the voice is conflicting, 
emblematic of the ambivalent state of tension that defines the experience of desire for the 
early Berryman.  
 The woman is symbolic, like the homeless from “The Statue,” of the problematic nature 
of desire—that it is both the animating force in human social life, but also a source of 
anxious suffering. This contradiction reemerges later in the poem, when the woman observes, 
“I suppose it was lust/But it was holy and awful.” The paradox of desire, Berryman claims at 
this point in his poetry, is not only that it is contradictory; he also has an intimation of the 
discovery he was to make in Sonnets to Chris, which is that, though lust is immoral, it is 
“holy,” a transcendentally intense experience essential to life. In this poem, too, Berryman 
seems to understand a notion that would animate his problematic search for an as-yet-
undiscovered justification for immorality—that, “What I am looking for (I am) may 
be/Happening in the gaps of what I know.” While this statement is opaque enough to be 
impossible to fully parse, that seems to be the point. The object of desire—satisfaction—is 
unsayable, only available in transient, imperfect manifestations.  
 Ultimately, though “The Statue” shows Berryman’s inability to find a language for the 
intensity of his own experience, his knack for constructing dramatic voices, from his very 
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first book, betrayed a latent experimental urge. It would not be until The Dream Songs that he 
would provide his own subjective experience of the world with a voice. And it was the 
voice—the mask—that would give him the liberty to express the full intensity of his 
consciousness, subverting the challenges of conveying experience in its fullness in the form 
of a poem. 
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II: “Crumpling a syntax at a sudden need”: Sonnets to Chris (1948) 
“…I am this strange thing I despised; you are. 
To become ourselves we are these wayward things.” 
 
 This chapter extends the analysis of Berryman’s understanding of the problem of desire 
and its relation to his transforming style. In Chapter One, I demonstrated how Berryman, in 
“The Statue,” identified desire as a conceptual quagmire. As articulated through the symbolic 
homeless, Berryman demonstrated the way in which desire is at once a source of suffering 
and pleasure. Within that duality, too, Berryman’s early understanding of pleasure was that 
there exist two forms of satisfaction. First, in the symbol of the lovers, Berryman conveyed 
the transient bliss of physical satisfaction, whose mode of resolving desire was quickly and 
summarily dismissed. More nuanced, however, was Berryman’s interpretation of the 
symbolic statue. As a commentary on the immortal work of art, the statue was both enduring 
and transient. Symbolically, the statue stood for the satisfaction of desire through the 
achievement of eminence—i.e, what Berryman claims is “the ultimate good, Respect.” 
Problematically, however, Berryman understood that even respect is transient, making it an 
equally invalid option as pleasure. Berryman dismisses both solutions, opting instead to 
idealize the position of the artist, whose work remains “tolerant,” transcends mortality, 
regardless of the subject of creation.  
 Stylistically, “The Statue” emulates the stiff weight of its central image, enacting a 
formal recreation of the poet-as-sculptor. Berryman, during the extramarital affair 
documented in Sonnets to Chris, experienced a discovery of the intensity and passion of 
desire, complicating his earlier understanding of pleasure as a form of satisfaction to be 
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philosophically dismissed. Desire remained problematic, but the experience of passion 
influenced his style, resulting in a chaotic and exuberant mode of expression.  
Philosophically, Berryman revised his earlier philosophical attitude towards pleasure, 
embracing its capacity to infuse life with significance, while also acknowledging the guilt 
and suffering intrinsic to desire. While not central to my analysis, Sonnet 30 illustrates 
pleasure’s capacity to infuse reality with meaning. It narrates a “weeks-long day,” which 
Berryman struggles to call back into his poem. Berryman recounts the day as a laundry list of 
transient moments, 
 If I will I can—rain thrice, sheets, a torrent 
 Spaced by the dry sun, Sunday thirst that went 
 Sharp-set from town to town, down cul-de-sac 
 To smoke a blind pig for a liquid snack… (CP 85) 
The poem ends by admitting that Berryman recalls only one moment in its entirety. The 
implication is that his desire somehow infused an otherwise insignificant moment with 
profound meaning. He says, “of that day I have wholly/One moment (weeks I played the 
friendly joker)/Your eyes married to mine in the car mirror.” The insignificant moment—a 
passing glance—stands out, immortalized in Berryman’s memory, because of the 
transformational effect that desire has on human experience. Desire, for Berryman, was the 
force that introduced into his own gaze the “extravagant perception” he understood as 
integral to the work of art. Desire, while still a contradictory source of both suffering and 
pleasure, has its own way of solidifying what seems transient. Unlike the art of “The Statue,” 
which uses pride and gravity to elevate that which is imperfect, the sonnets tap into the 
energy of desire to give weight to Berryman’s transient and flawed being.  
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 With the distinction between “The Statue” and Berryman’s sonnets in mind, it will 
become clear that this chapter tracks the relationship between Berryman’s understanding of 
pleasure and the stylistic risks he began to take in the Sonnets to Chris. Looking, in 
particular, at Sonnet 58, the chapter notes the stylistic difference between Berryman’s 
description of the moral Good Samaritan figure and its description of pleasure. Experiencing 
and articulating in a distinctly intense language the exuberant thrill of pleasure, for 
Berryman, was a way of giving a fitting form to the burden of desire he had put forth in “The 
Statue.” While desire gave, for Berryman, a great deal of weight to human existence, finding 
the appropriate stylistic-formal shell through which desire could take on its appropriate 
intensity demanded a perspective on language that acknowledged the lightness of words 
within syntax. The more musical, rhythmic syntax, echoing the exhilaration of pleasure, 
conveyed the intensity of pleasure; and in finding a form, embracing the intensity of pleasure, 
Berryman made poetic use of an integral facet of desire—its intensity. Despite the fact that 
pleasure is transient as it is for the symbolic, it is a source of exuberance and energy that, in a 
way, nullifies the weight the contradiction he articulated in “The Statue.”  
 By “the lightness of words,” the argument of this essay in other words is that 
Berryman’s experience with desire—the intensity of pleasure and suffering—necessitated a 
style that reflected an experience characterized by energy. The way in which Berryman’s 
syntax mirrors energy is its modulations, its variations in speed. By varying between 
extremely fluid, mellifluous phrasing, and the weight of stark, direct statements, Berryman 
created a style in which high and low points were struck variously within each poem. In 
order to do so, Berryman appears to have had to become aware of the fact that words are 
weightless, entirely mobile within the syntax of a sentence. In the alterations Berryman made 
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to the syntactical structures within the Sonnets—and, even earlier, in “The Nervous Songs”—
Berryman, through lightness, produced a style brimming with the energy and intensity of the 
conflicting elements of the problem of desire, i.e. the excruciating pain of deprivation and the 
exuberant thrill of pleasure. What heightened the intensity of emotion, too, was the 
overbearing weight of Berryman’s guilt. 
 Sonnet 58 contemplates directly the thrill of intense pleasure and the precarious chaos 
of deception. In order to do so, the description of the Good Samaritan exhibits a dull 
slowness of style, which is counteracted by the quick lift of energy in the description of the 
immoral life of pleasure. This particular sonnet is highly conventional, presenting the 
inability to exist morally as Berryman’s problem, a theme throughout the sonnets—that 
Berryman felt he was damned to be a passionate lover, incapable of being morally upright, 
because the moral lifestyle was, though satisfying in its particular way, lacking in the kind of 
vigor to which he was drawn in both life and art. First, Berryman invokes a Good Samaritan 
figure to symbolize the moral lifestyle of which society at large approves, and the merit of 
which Berryman recognizes, 
Sensible, coarse, and moral; in decent brown; 
Its money doling to an orphanage; 
Sober… well-spirited but sober; sage 
Plain nourishing life nor you nor I could down (CP 99) 
 
While the Samaritan is “sensible,” “decent,” “sober,” “well-spirited,” and while he donates 
money to charity, he resembles the statue of Humboldt in the icy lifelessness of his “coarse” 
sobriety.  
 In what follows Berryman’s description of the Good Samaritan, Berryman sets up the 
contrast to his own immoral life of pleasure, which takes on an intensity and quickness in the 
rapid, mellifluous musicality. In other words, Berryman, the driver of the poem, hits the gas 
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pedal and heightens the intensity of the moment to reflect the energy of a life lived through 
deceptive pleasure: 
Plain nourishing life nor you nor I could down 
I doubt, our blinkers lost, blood like a clown 
Dancing upon a one-night hot-foot stage, 
Brains in a high wind, high brains, the next page 
Trembling,—the water’s fine, come in and drown. 
The metaphor of the clown’s dance on a stage reveals an underlying anxiety about Berryman 
being exposed in his moralistic performance, the sham he felt he was living as a deceptive 
husband. Anxiety—as much as pleasure and deprivation—adds another layer of intensity to 
the emotional chaos into which Berryman immersed himself, and out of which he pulled the 
vehemence of his language.  
 Berryman’s experience with the intense existence he conducted in his extramarital 
affair was conflicting; even the profound thrill he enjoyed was an occasion for anxiety and 
chaos. Sonnet 39 laments the condition, Berryman asking himself if it is necessary for him to 
be immersed in the delirium of passion, wonder if he must, 
Writhe in silly ecstasy? Banal 
Greetings rehearse till a quotidian drawl 
Carols a promise? Stoop an acolyte 
Who stood my master? Must my blood flow bright, 
Childish, I chilled and darkened? Strong pulse crawl? (CP 90) 
 
Though daily life was made to seem dull by the intensity of his passion, Berryman’s 
metaphor in the sonnet implies that the thrill of intensity was that it allowed him to revert 
into an infant state, his very blood becoming “Childish.” The realization that he was more 
consumed by the desire to revert into a state of pure intensity of emotion—associated here 
with infancy—will reemerge in the discussion of The Dream Songs, but here it is seen as a 
curse, as an obstacle to leading the moral existence Berryman clearly felt obligated to 
conduct.  
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 Berryman, questioning whether or not his passion is necessary, whether or not he can 
live morally like the Good Samaritan “in decent brown,” realizes that he is doomed to remain 
enthralled by pleasure. “I see I do, it must, trembling I see,” he says. Fastened in “smiling 
pain,” there is clearly the sense that Berryman is unable to fully accept the life-giving bliss of 
pleasure, too weighed down by moral considerations. Oddly, Berryman introduces pride into 
the sonnet, explaining that “neither pride don nor the fever shed/More, till the furor when we 
slide to bed,/Enter calenture for the boiling brain.”  It seems that pleasure is not just thrilling, 
but Berryman’s source of “pride,” a word that echoes back to “The Statue.” The statue’s 
distinguishing characteristic was his pride, and Berryman here conflates the two forms of 
satisfying desire, perhaps in one of his attempts to “justify” his immorality. Finding, through 
passionate pleasure, his own version of both the lovers’ “happiness” and the statue’s “pride” 
seems to be a kind of full transcendence, or erasure, of the suffering caused by deprivation. 
The thrill of pleasure negates the immorality, and the necessary pain of desire—all of which 
is extinguished in the fire of “sliding to bed.” 
 Berryman’s investment in passion is as artistic as it is personal. In the very next sonnet, 
in fact, Berryman introduces an image of a statue, echoing the early meditation upon weight 
and the shell of style in which content appears. He claims that his poetry no longer addresses 
or recreates the stiff, fixed, lifelessness of the statuesque. This provides another way of 
understanding the transition Berryman was undergoing—changing from a poet concerned 
with finding topics worthy of eminence, into a poet of movement and life: 
Marble nor monuments whereof then we spoke 
We speak of no more; spasmodic as the wasp 
About my windowpane, our short songs rasp— 
Not those alone before their singers choke—Our sweetest. (CP 90) 
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Comparing his songs to the wasp flitting about the windowpane, Berryman shares a poetic 
insight: “none hopes now with one smart stroke/Or whittling years to crack away the 
hasp/Across the ticking future.” Berryman seems to be saying that he no longer, as a poet, 
seeks to unlock the “hasp” or latch that fastens the future, i.e. no more does his verse seek to 
immortalize anything at all, but instead to focus on the transient lightness of the energetic and 
ever-moving wasp.  
 Berryman, in this sonnet, expresses the conviction that, “all our grasp/Cannot beyond 
the butt secure its smoke.” Berryman decides that poetry can only make use of what is 
available—that is, human experience. His entire vision of what function his poetry must 
serve has transformed after his experience with the passionate intensity of pleasure and need. 
The sextet that follows recapitulates Berryman’s insight, saying that the previous 
understanding of poetry’s function was, “A Renaissance fashion, not to be recalled.” Trying 
to discover the immortal subject, he claims, is not worthy of emulating in poetry. “We dinch 
‘eternal numbers’ and go out./We understand exactly what we are.” In doing so, Berryman 
accepts the transience of human existence, the brief lightness of human life, without needing 
to immortalize, using instead that passionate brevity as the source of the new style in which 
he examines human imperfection. The thrilling intensity of passion, Berryman is saying, is 
more important than discovering any eternal truth. “Argent I craft you as the star/Of flower-
shut evening: who stays on to doubt/I sang true?” It is almost as if transience is reason 
enough to be fantastical and passionate in the crafting of poetry. No one survives, “stays on,” 
to doubt the poetry’s truth, so the poetry might as well be as vivid and engaging, as “argent” 
and metallically bright, as possible.  
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 Returning to Sonnet 58, which is stylistically an example of Berryman’s “argent” 
crafting, the two descriptions, executed so distinctly, serve as evidence that Berryman 
understood the intensity of his newly passionate existence as an occasion for syntactical 
experimentation. Berryman infused his language with the energy of passion, which speaks to 
the function of craftsmanship—a reality of its own can be created in the language of poetry, 
whether true to life or not. The description of the Good Samaritan is written in curt phrases 
separated by semi-colons, its motion unfolding in a stilted uniformity: “Sensible, coarse, 
moral; in decent brown.” The modifying words take on weight because of the emphasis 
placed on each through this attenuated sentence structure; each word, in these shrunken fields 
of language, stands out as a massive skyscraper. The syntax itself is monotonous, list-like, 
each word carrying the weight of emphasis.  
 The sonic effect of the description of morality is similar to that of “The Statue,” which 
used an analogous structure of stacked phrases to create its tone of grandiloquence. 
Describing again an image of moral perfection, Berryman reverts to the tone of the earlier 
poem, but with greater awareness of its relation to his content. The monotony exists in 
tension with the music of exuberance that follows. As he slides, in the sonnet, into the 
description of his own immorality, the syntax grows more disorganized, heightens into the 
speed and fluidity of the passionate intensity being described. Reconstructing the sentence in 
the interest of heightened euphony, the poem is released into a lightness that reads with more 
fluidity, “nor you nor I could down/I doubt,” for example, pairing sounds through 
alliteration. Though it makes for a more musical verse, it welcomes a reading speed that feels 
more dangerous, more haphazard, like the one-foot dance of immorality described in the 
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song. That is, the syntactically produced intensity resonates with the thrilling quality of 
passion. 
 At this point, having considered the important role that Berryman’s experience with the 
intensity of passion played in the transformation of his style, the chapter will transition to 
focusing on the attempted idealization of immorality and the poem that inspired Berryman to 
create the sonnets. This is the more problematic element of Sonnets to Chris—that it was an 
attempt at making “wickedness soluble in art” (CP 70), as Berryman himself clarified in the 
collection’s preface, a hopeful use of poetry’s transformative capability in the interest of 
creating the ideal world through which he could escape the deception and suffering caused by 
his affair. Both the poem and the intensity of passion are caught in a naive idealization, 
which overestimates the capacity of both to have an effect on one’s lived experience.   
 By making wickedness “soluble,” Berryman meant that he sought a justification for 
immorality through poetry. Again, Berryman’s understanding of poetry is that it has a 
transformational effect. Not only were his experiments with language a means of more 
accurately conveying the lightness and thrill of pleasure, the stylistic risks were an adventure 
in the hidden possibilities of the language. Berryman hoped that if he could experiment 
enough with the language, he might find a phrase that might justify the immorality that 
haunted him: 
I prod our English: cough me up a word, 
Slip me an epithet will justify 
My daring fondle, fumble of far fire 
Crackling nearby, unreasonable as a surd, 
A flash of light, an insight (CP 103) 
Berryman would later understand that this attempt to moralize immorality was the Sonnets’ 
“original fault.” Ultimately, his experiment failed. The reason why the endeavor was 
problematic in the first place, though, is that its attempted idealization of reality resulted in 
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implicating Berryman in a solipsistic naivete; such an idealization assumes that certain facets 
of being can be erased, such as shame, guilt, and social-moral conventions. Or rather, such a 
hopeful attitude overestimates the influence of poetry on reality, idealizing language to the 
extent that it can alter historico-cultural constructions that have developed over centuries, in 
this case morality. In The Dream Songs, Berryman would have to de-idealize the world of his 
poetry again in order to re-examine the mechanisms of desire. 
 Since the poems are intensely bound up with Berryman’s personal experience, Paul 
Mariani’s reading of Berryman’s journals show that Berryman was struggling with more 
emotional chaos than the sonnets let on in their attempted justification of immorality: 
What, he wondered, was holding his marriage together? He even fantasized 
Eileen and Chris’ husband pairing off like atoms into new constellations, the 
four making two new, happy couples. Then he discovered he was enjoying 
himself once more in Eileen’s company, and his guilt came crashing down on 
him with renewed force. But he was also angry and confused, and hated playing 
the devoted husband when he was obsessed with this other woman. He wanted 
no more of ‘this pretence-of-relation-we-don’t-have-and-can’t-have-again and 
this kindness more cruel than torture.’ Better perhaps to leave Eileen than 
continue this charade of a marriage. Then, one night, doing the dishes together, 
Eileen herself asked him why they kept up the marriage at all. Come fall, he 
promised her, if things didn’t improve, he would move out. Then he stormed out 
of the apartment and wandered up to the lake, shaking at what he’d said.13 
(Mariani 195) 
 
Clearly, then, the effort to make immorality “soluble” in the sonnets was an attempt at using 
poetry as therapy, but also as a intervention on cultural ills such as morality; the notion that 
poetry can alter a person’s psychology is far less far-fetched than the notion of a poem 
transforming a cultural climate, though neither is wholly inconceivable. Nonetheless, 
Berryman’s attempt at easing his own guilt was mistaken, in his mind, as an attempt at 
“justifying immorality” in a more philosophical sense. Berryman’s marital turmoil, his 
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deceptive behavior, and his emotional instability were all perhaps insupportable; Berryman’s 
immense personal investment in poetry’s potential arose out of his life’s excruciating 
circumstances, the only positive of which was the pleasure he found in the wild joy of his 
affair.  
 Though Berryman failed in his transformation of immorality, the sonnet sequence was 
an excellent format for the undertaking, since the sonnet formally develops an argument, and 
the sequence’s length allows for a sustained analysis. As a result, the sequence as a whole is 
a far more nuanced examination of desire than a single poem like “The Statue.” Because it is 
sequential, it is a sustained analysis, giving more time for thematic development. The sonnet, 
moreover, lends itself to intellectual argument; typically, Italian sonnets created a compact 
argument, presenting a problem in the octave, and then a resolution in the sestet. Berryman’s 
cerebral analyses, which seemed out of place in “The Statue,” have a home in the sonnet. At 
the same time, a sonnet is a “little song,” rhymed and rhythmic, conventionally using 
intellectual argument to meditate musically on the passionate realm of emotions. The sonnet 
made for the ideal form in which to conduct his personal-poetic experiment, yet its necessary 
musicality  demanded of Berryman a stylistic risk-taking that would push the boundaries of 
his use of syntax and language. 
 Sonnets is a philosophical and poetic paradigm shift for Berryman. While the 
discoveries he made about the function and language of poetry seem, based on the continued 
formal experimentation, to have remained vital to him as a poet, the ideal world without 
morality was clearly a misguided attempt at idealizing the function of a poem. The numerous 
justifications he wrangles up are extremely unconvincing. In Sonnet 58, the solution he 
proposes is historical, citing the “corruption of the working classes” in eighteenth century 
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England as the point at which attitudes towards eroticism shifted. It is unclear if Berryman is 
being completely forthright, and on whose understanding of the eighteenth century Berryman  
is basing his opinion. At that time, Berryman argues, “kisses” began “opening on betrothals,” 
that is to say, pleasure somehow became attached to social structures such as marriage. This, 
he claims, occurred as a result of a general cultural fear of publicly enjoyed pleasure and 
mirth. Society, Berryman argues, “writhes” in discomfort whenever music is gleefully 
released, when “shawm and flute flutter the twilight,” and when pleasure is public, i.e. 
“Conjugal, toothless, has a booth at the fair.” Berryman’s historical justification, while 
convincing in its historical way, contradicts the more powerful sense that, throughout Sonnets 
to Chris, he discovered the more powerful truth of passionate intensity. History is not what 
justifies pleasure. Rather, pleasure justifies itself, since it infuses life with meaning and 
intensity.  
 But Berryman, for whatever reason, could not be satisfied with this, and remained 
adamant on somehow framing the issue within moral conventions. The attempt at making 
immorality “soluble” was a failed experiment, the sonnets’ “original fault,” a form of 
wickedness in the poetry’s own right. The way in which intensity influenced the subject and 
language of Berryman’s work—the poetic, rather than moral, justification of pleasure—
seems, though, like a valid outcome—a solution in its own way. Berryman’s commitment to 
making artistic use of the intensity he found so engrossing is a testament to his being a 
student of life, a quality without which his poetry would have remained mired in the 
monotonous grandiloquence of “The Statue.” The poetry should not suffer from the same 
moral judgments as Berryman himself deserves. In fact, the poetic discoveries, in a rather 
meaningful way, do indeed make “wickedness soluble in art.” While “soluble” can mean 
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“capable of being solved,” it can also mean, “capable of being dissolved.” When a substance 
dissolves, it transforms from a solid into a liquid, becoming perhaps lighter, but certainly 
more malleable and fluid. In the most objective sense of the word, Berryman discovered that, 
as soon as intensity found its way into his poetry, both language and style took on greater 
fluidity in his hands, a malleable lightness. Berryman exerted more control over the language 
with a greater degree of ease, becoming a significantly more interesting poet in the process of 
his descent into an unfortunate, destructive affair. 
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III: Humor and The Dream Songs 
 Published in two volumes—77 Dream Songs (1964) and His Toy, His Dream, His Rest 
(1968)—The Dream Songs is a long poem organized into seven books containing three-
hundred and eighty-five individual songs. This chapter examines the use of humor in the 
portrayal of the pain of desire in Song 4. What takes place in The Dream Songs, which is 
absent from any of Berryman’s prior poems, is Berryman’s use of the poetic mask, Henry, 
allowed him the liberty to convey shameful experience of suffering through humor, and, in 
doing so, finding a way of putting artifice to use. Drawing on Berryman’s conception of the 
poem as a transformational art form, this chapter considers the use of humor as a way of 
reframing the suffering engendered by desire. In this reframing of suffering, Berryman 
transforms pain into humor, the effect of which is ambiguous. 
 In one sense, the transformation of pain into humor is a way of transcending the 
suffering evoked. This is a conception of humor drawn from Sigmund Freud, who argues that 
the humorous attitude “refuses to be hurt by the arrows of reality or to be compelled to suffer. 
It insists that it is impervious to wounds dealt by the outside world, in fact, that these are 
merely occasions for affording it pleasure.”14 This would be an argument for Berryman’s use 
of humor as a way of coping with the suffering being represented in the Song. Certainly, 
Berryman’s humor is, in fact, amusing, and through the particular lens, the suffering 
portrayed seems to be diminished in importance—lightened, so to speak. This chapter, 
though, will argue for an additional understanding of Berryman’s humor—as an ironic 
humor, one through which Berryman unsettles the reader’s comfort and, in doing so, draws 
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one even closer to the fact of human suffering, questioning the way in which one is to 
respond.   
 Most scholarship on The Dream Songs is of an overarching nature, struggling with the 
general themes, structures, ideas, and concerns of the entire work. Critics have tried to 
decipher the long poem’s overall structure, which is nonexistent. To the extent that scholars 
are expected to trust Berryman himself on the matter, the poet has stated that there is no 
discernable architecture to the poem. In a 1968 interview with the Harvard Advocate, 
Berryman was asked, “Is there any ulterior structure to The Dream Songs?” He answered in 
the negative: 
Ah—you mean, somebody can get to be an associate professor or an assistant 
professor by finding it out? Mr. Plotz, there is none. Il n’y en a pas! There’s not 
a trace of it. Some of the Songs are in alphabetical order; but, mostly, they just 
belong to areas of hope and fear that Henry is going through at a given time. 
That’s how I worked them out.15 
 
My intent is not to address these questions that treat The Dream Songs as a structural entity. 
Attempting to address these mysteries is the equivalent of a dog chasing its own tail. Though 
they are fascinating mysteries to explore, the use of syntax and humor in the Songs is more 
relevant to this essay’s interest in Berryman’s understanding of the function of poetry.  
 The Dream Songs, though, is an anomaly—a maze of unanswered questions, which 
Berryman seems to have purposely created in order to puzzle readers. In the “Young 
Woman’s Song,” from The Dispossessed, this notion of mystery arose as a driving force 
behind desire. “What I am looking for (I am) may be,” Berryman said, “Happening in the 
gaps of what I know.” That which appears to be mysterious infuses one with a drive to fully 
understand, a desire for a complete knowledge of the mysterious object. Considering the fact 
that the theme of desire is central not only to The Dream Songs, but also his entire body of 
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work, Berryman seems to have made use of his understanding of desire in the creation of a 
work of literature.  
 In terms of a dynamic of desire between the reader and Berryman’s work, the effect is a 
simple matter of creating intrigue, of using the poem as a site in which the readers’ 
boundaries of understanding, of belief, of comfort, and of confidence all can be challenged 
and expanded. In response to the mystery, part of which is the figure of Henry, I have tried to 
come to my own personal understanding of The Dream Songs, and to remain true to it in this 
essay. The fact is that, due to Berryman’s use of language, there can only be a personal 
reading of his poetry. The personal understanding of the poetry I have come to is based on 
the idea of a mask—a tool through which experience can be transformed, made more 
tolerable for the conscious mind. The question of Berryman’s use of minstrel blackface, for 
example, can be understood as another way of suggesting that even the most horrendous 
atrocity, such as slavery, can be made funny and entertaining—if only one wears a mask. 
That, in a nutshell, also explains the function of the mysterious “Henry,” who both “is and is 
not” John Berryman. That he “is and is not” the poet may seem like a trick or a paradox, but 
it is in fact Berryman’s honest admission that Henry is a mask, and that the mask changes the 
way in which reality is read.  
 In a more abstract sense, Berryman’s understanding of the mask as a tool for 
transforming reality also serves as a useful metaphor for his understanding of the function of 
a poem. I take this from a passage in Berryman’s critical biography of Stephen Crane. 
Discussing Crane’s poetry, Berryman makes an interesting point, one that has a way of 
telling us as much about his own work as it does Crane’s. The poems Berryman analyzes, he 
says, “have in in common also cruelty and pity, their nakedness, a kind of awful bluntness; 
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and contemptuous indifference to everything that makes up ‘poetry’ for other people. What 
shall we do with them?” If I did not know any better, I would think Berryman is narrating my 
own thoughts about The Dream Songs. But, of course, that would be ludicrous.  
Nonetheless, Berryman goes on to describe Crane’s poems in medical terms, coming to the 
understanding that poetry can be used to alleviate suffering: 
[Crane’s poems] are not like literary compositions. They are like things just 
seen and said, said for use. The handwriting of doctors is not beautiful; the point 
of their prescriptions is just to be made out. (It is remarkable, I have noticed 
since the present chapter was written, that Crane used the peculiar world “pills” 
for his poems…) Robert Graves, one of the shrewdest, craziest, and most 
neglected students of poetry living, laid out a theory of the origin of poetry 
once. A savage dreams, is frightened by the dream, and goes to the medicine 
man to have it explained. The medicine man can make up anything, anything 
will reassure the savage, so long as the manner of its delivery is impressive; so 
he chants, perhaps he stamps his foot, people like rhythm, what he says 
becomes rhythmical, people like to hear things again, and what he says begins 
to rhyme. Poetry begins—as a practical matter, for use. It reassures the savage. 
Perhaps he only hears back again, chanted, the dream he just told the medicine 
man, but he is reassured; it is like a spell… Now Crane’s poetry is like a series 
of primitive anti-spells… He has truths to tell… So Crane just says, like a 
medicine man before chanting or poetry began. And what he says is savage: 
unprotected, forestlike…. Part of the irony in Crane’s poetry results from the 
imposition of his complex modern doubt upon a much stronger primeval set of 
his mind.16  
 
For an amateur student of poetry like myself, this understanding of the poem is both oddly 
basic, and also profoundly meaningful. Of course, representation is always also a 
transformation of reality—this doesn’t seem like much of a revelation. But what Berryman 
means is that art actually alters human well-being, and changes one’s orientation towards the 
self. As such, the case is not simply that psychology influences representation; Berryman 
holds that the inverse is also true—that art is a sort of spell, that it infects one’s mind, almost 
invasively. The work of art transforms a subject’s perception of the world, thus altering the 
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 Berryman, John. Stephen Crane: a critical biography. New York: Cooper Square Press. 2001. 273. 
Print. Hereafter, Crane.  
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subject’s psychology, their entire orientation towards themselves and the world. Poetry is a 
way of re-understanding what can be mortifying and excruciating to the human mind—can 
lighten that which weighs on one’s thoughts.  
 What Berryman’s poetry reveals is that accessing the poem’s potential for lightening is 
extremely complex. Neither is entirely a positive, reassuring, helpful transformation; more 
often than not, in the songs, Berryman’s attempts at lightening a situation may only be a way 
of making that situation more unsettling. In this essay, I have demonstrated how the problem 
of desire weighed heavily on Berryman’s mind; thus far, my analysis has shown that neither 
“The Statue” or Sonnets to Chris were able to lighten the problem of desire whatsoever. “The 
Statue” sought to elevate and immortalize the problem into a subject of statue-esque 
significance, while the Sonnets’ portrayal of pleasure is haunted by Berryman’s inability to 
fully accept and embrace desire.  
 In The Dream Songs, desire remained a major source of pain and anxiety. Dream Song 
25, for example, expresses through Henry a desire for return to infancy, the time in which his 
“need” did not torture him. “Hand me back my crawl, condign Heaven,” Henry says, begging 
for the infant’s form of movement, a metaphor for a more innocent and asexual physical 
existence. “Condign” means “well-deserved, fitting,” and the phrasing seems to suggest that 
Henry is either directing his request towards Heaven, or that “condign Heaven” modifies 
“crawl.”17 That infant state, Henry claims, is well-deserved. “Tighten into a ball/elongate & 
valved Henry. Tuck him peace.” Reading the lines of Song 25 with Berryman’s conception 
of poetry as a reassuring “spell” in mind draws my attention towards the verbs, “tighten” and 
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 Both are meaningful. The question of religion in Berryman’s poetry is extremely interesting, since he 
was for quite a long time a learned atheist. He conducted scholarly research into the question of God, 
immersing himself in theology, but never fully committing to an acceptance of God. Nonetheless, The 
Dream Songs constantly expresses two conflicting emotions: the desire/need for God, and an active 
rebellion against God. 
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“tuck,” particularly the deeply simple three-word sentence, “Tuck him peace.” Berryman 
expresses, with great clarity, an extremely basic human desire for comfort and peace, and 
through verbs that evoke the actions that would engender a calm state of body and mind.  
 The verbs in the poem, because they imply the presence of an external force acting 
upon Henry, reveal Berryman’s hope for salvation from desire. Henry asks to be tucked and 
tightened, to be altered by an external presence. Henry then asks, more directly, for the end to 
his desire. “Render him sightless,” he says, “or ruin at high rate his crampon focus,/wipe out 
his need.” Again, the verbs in these lines are vital to the effect of the poem. Henry longs to be 
rendered sightless, for an external presence to cause him to be  unable to construct desires 
based on his perceptions, for his need to be wiped by another like a blemish. If the poem was 
indeed a spell, with the goal of assuaging the suffering Berryman felt because of desire, the 
verbs’ effect goes beyond expressing the yearning for redemption from desire. The verbs, all 
of which imply that Henry is in need of an external presence’s intervention, express Henry’s 
sense of impotence. But more importantly, the verbs express a longing for more than 
salvation from lust—they provide a language for Berryman to express desire for passivity. In 
doing so, Berryman subverts the assumed function of a verb. Rather than using the verb to 
convey action, Berryman conveys Henry’s desire for transformation-in-passivity.  
 The usage of verbs in Song 25 serves as a useful example of my understanding of 
Berryman’s re-presentation of the problem of desire through humor, in that it is a subversion 
of a traditional usage. Though desire for Berryman remained a source of both pleasure and 
suffering, the depiction of this duality in Dream Song 4 dislocates desire from Berryman’s 
subjective experience of pain/desire, repositioning desire as a source of humor. The humor, 
however, is not a means through which Berryman escapes the suffering depicted, or not 
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entirely; through lifting suffering into humor, Berryman asserts a more troubling possibility, 
i.e. the notion that experiences of suffering have the potential for humor. Rather than being 
an escape, humor forces Berryman’s reader to look closely at suffering, and to dismiss 
another person’s pain, testing the extent to which a reader is willing to put aside pity in favor 
of pleasure. Berryman uses humor, among other things, to make use of his readers’ 
selfishness.  
De-idealizing Henry’s World 
 In the poetic experiment Berryman conducted with Sonnets to Chris, Berryman sought 
to justify immorality, an undertaking that amounts to an idealization of pleasure. To 
understand the difference between Sonnets to Chris and The Dream Songs, it is first 
important to keep in mind the ideal world Berryman attempted to construct in the Sonnets—a 
reality in which immorality could be dismissed, a hedonism in which pleasure could be 
upheld as its own virtue. Berryman’s strong commitment to morality, ultimately, resulted in 
the Sonnets’ failure to fulfill the construction of that ideal reality. The last sonnet provides an 
image of Berryman’s understanding of the naivete of his idealization: “it was a good evening, 
an evening to please,/I kissed her in the kitchen—ecstasies—among so much good we 
tamped down the crime” (CP 129). Pleasure, though a source of newfound ecstasy in 
Berryman’s life and poetry, was also a tool for repressing the injustice of his actions.  
 From the very beginning of The Dream Songs, Berryman de-idealizes the world of the 
poem, citing the first experience of loss as the moment in which Henry’s reality takes its 
unimpressive, painful form18:   
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 As The Dream Songs deals with a particular individual’s fictional subjectivity, the poem will be referred 
to as its own world, meaning more that The Dream Songs is an interpretation of life rather than an attempt 
at faithfully recreating it. In that way, though Henry is a fictional character, it is through Henry that 
Berryman interprets life.  
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All the world like a woolen lover 
Once did seem on Henry’s side. 
Then came a departure. 
Thereafter nothing fell out as it might or ought. 
I don’t see how Henry, pried 
Open for all the world to see, survived. (DS 3) 
A stanza from Dream Song 101 defines what Berryman means by loss: 
…a sense of total LOSS 
afflicted me thereof: 
an absolute disappearance of continuity & love 
and children away at school, the weight of the cross, 
and everything is what it seems. (DS 118) 
 
Berryman uses Song 1 to ensure that the world in which he portrays Henry’s existence is 
always haunted by an undercurrent of loss. Henry has learned that “everything is what it 
seems.” Reality, in that first song, is de-idealized, not a fantasy of “continuity & love” but 
rather a burden, “the weight of the cross.” Quite significantly, loss is also the moment at 
which Henry feels the inverse need for “continuity & love.” That is, loss is not only the 
experience that de-idealizes existence; it also is the moment in which desire makes itself felt.  
 The way in which Berryman establishes Henry’s de-idealized world is through a de-
idealization of the enigmatic “loss” Henry suffers. This reversal occurs through Berryman’s 
irony, which conveys the most devastating of traumatic experiences with directness, 
simplicity and brevity. The effect of the irony is to drain the entire trauma of Henry’s initial 
loss of its emotional content. In this case, Berryman’s ironic dearth of sentimentality serves 
as an inverse example of the analysis this essay makes of Dream Song 4 below. Song 1 
empties Henry’s trauma of all emotion, conveying it with the utmost gravity, not allowing the 
reader any amount of ambiguity with regards to whether or not the instance is traumatic. 
With brevity and directness, Berryman’s voice treats Henry’s trauma with indifference, a 
flatness of tone that unsettles its reader; whereas one might expect a lyrical outpour of 
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emotion, Berryman’s tone expresses Henry’s loss with a stark, factual, plain-spoken mask. 
As with the way in which humor might call into question a reader’s understanding of 
suffering, flatness in Song 1 calls into question one’s attitude towards trauma. In a world 
where “everything is what it seems,” trauma no longer is reason for mourning or grief, but 
rather a weight to be accepted without question or regret.  
 Without attempting to overreach into Berryman’s biography, Henry’s loss, as 
articulated in Song 1, is presented to the reader as a moment in which a transformation 
occurs—and Henry, all of a sudden, is haunted by the sense that there is something amiss, 
that there is a need within himself that goes forever unfulfilled.  “All the world like a woolen 
lover/once did seem on Henry’s side,” begins the stanza; basically, Berryman sets up the loss 
as the moment in which Henry formulates an understanding of his own constitutional desire. 
Whereas, at some point, Henry believed everything necessary was available to him, the 
“departure” lead to the loss of that ideal of completeness. The first loss also creates Henry’s 
first intimation of desire. Berryman creates, in other words, a character whose subjective 
experience of reality is not only de-idealized, but also defined by a permanent state of desire. 
The desire, ironically, is for an idealized reality, the reality of infancy, of a state in which 
desire is irrelevant. What Henry longs for is the end of longing. Again, this is what 
Berryman’s text expresses in begging, “hand me back my crawl.” Henry is defined by an 
impossible desire.  
 Having tangled this essay into a knot, the following section seeks to interpret the comic 
in Song 4, an analysis that required the establishment of Henry’s de-idealized reality, 
however unmanageable such a hypothesis may have been. While it is impossible to explain, 
objectively, the mechanisms of humor, Soren Kierkegaard’s conception of the comic serves 
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as a fitting framework in which Berryman’s own humor might be understood. The reason 
being, in this case, that Kierkegaard’s definition takes into account several mutually central 
considerations—the role played by pain, and the humor of a contradiction. If nothing else, 
Henry’s reality is itself a contradiction, in which the pain of desire plays a major role.  
 In the Concluding Unscientific Postcript, Kierkegaard defines the comic as being 
“present wherever there is a contradiction, and wherever one is ignoring the pain, because it 
is non-essential.”19 Several examples are given, and the work of one who seeks to explain the 
comic is in locating the contradiction, as it must be identified and teased out. What requires 
clarification, however, is Kierkegaard’s notion of “non-essential” pain, and on that matter 
Kierkegaard expanded, “The comic apprehension evokes the contradiction or makes it 
manifest by having mind the way out, which is why the contradiction is painless.” That is to 
say, if pain is central to the comic contradiction,the humor cannot rely upon a condition of 
aboslute pain; there must be a “way out,” a pain that is not absolute and lasting, suffering 
from which there can be a release.  
 In the Songs’ text as interpreted within this essay, Henry’s world is defined, from the 
very outset, by the fact that it has been emptied of idealizations. Yet, in contradiction, this 
loss of idealizations results in a consequent desire for an ideal state—the asexual, innocent 
infancy. The world built upon within Berryman’s text operates within this contradiction 
ceaselessly, and in doing so locates itself directly in the thick wood of the absurd humor of an 
existential contradiction. The overarching comedy of Berryman’s text is that Henry’s 
experience of loss de-idealized reality for him, yet it also resulted in the emergence of desire, 
and desire functions by constructing idealizations. This contradiction could be tragic, but 
Berryman is shrewd enough to comprehend that the humor of desire is not in its tragically 
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mistaken re-idealization of the world, but in the fact that desire—specifically, now, I mean 
sexual desire—inflates and idealizes the most mundane and insignificant aspects of reality. 
This is the contradiction, in truth—not the fact that desire re-idealizes the de-idealized world 
that engendered said desire, but that desire idealizes the least significant, least mysterious 
elements of reality.  
 With this conception of the humor of desire in mind, Dream Song 4 is the example this 
essay uses in order to demonstrate an example of Berryman’s comedy.   By virtue of a 
creative use of enjambment and syntax, Berryman amplifies the weight of extremely 
mundane and insignificant elements of the experience being represented. Desire transforms 
the figure of the woman into an object of Henry’s desire, whose fleeting eye contact becomes 
the springboard for a burst of repressed energy, 
Filling her compact & delicious body 
with chicken paprika, she glanced at me 
twice. 
Fainting with interest, I hungered back 
and only the fact of her husband & four other people 
kept me from springing on her 
 
or falling at her little feet and crying 
‘You are the hottest one for years of night 
Henry’s dazed eyes 
have enjoyed, Brilliance.’ (DS 6) 
The organization of the first sentence, which snakes across three lines of verse, places 
“twice” at its end, isolating the word on its own line. While two glances have absolutely no 
concrete significance, Henry’s lust gives them an enormous amount of weight. The humorous 
contradiction, here, is in the fact that, simply because the woman has glanced “twice,” Henry 
is suddenly ablaze with an inhuman charge of exuberant energy. His mind has jumped to the 
utmost extreme idealization of those two glances, and even so, all it takes is five people to 
prevent the release of that energy.  
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 The triumph over suffering through humor rests in the fact that Berryman’s particular 
brand of humor refuses to downplay the absurdity of desire. Henry’s desire is portrayed as 
overpowering, functioning on an almost unimaginably intense scale. Where Berryman could 
have been reserved, in order to minimize the significance of the moment, his portrayal of the 
mechanism of lust contains the kind of exuberance and intensity that desire can infuse into an 
experience. Rather than use the poem as a space in which to “solve” the immorality of lust, 
as he did in The Sonnets, the Song plays with the fact that lust is transformative. As I showed 
above, the syntax has a function similar to desire, placing gravity on the glances upon which 
Henry fixates. But Berryman’s attention to description is such that he transforms every object 
of Henry’s desire into “delicious” food, heightening rather than diminishing the magnitude of 
desire.   
 As amusing as the contradictory nature of Henry’s desire is, there is a contradiction 
between the experience represented and Berryman’s poetic representation. While, within, 
Henry is brimming with both sexual and poetic fervor, the five-person presence of social 
policing functions so effectively that it forces Henry to contain himself. Henry’s desire is, in 
part, a desire to express himself both physically and poetically, and the presence of Henry’s 
lyrical verse demonstrates that, in the same way that physical pleasure can offer a release 
from desire, so too can poetry. Berryman’s poem is the release from the pain in the 
contradiction. By putting Henry’s absurdly intense suffering into verse, already, Berryman 
has created the release that Henry needs—yet, Henry remains unaware. The irony of the 
situation—Henry longing to break out in verse in Berryman’s poetic representation of that 
longing—is the most amusing contradiction in the entire poem, and the only one from which 
the way out has been provided.  
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 Berryman’s use of humor in The Dream Songs encourages its reader to take pleasure in 
Henry’s suffering. In doing so, Berryman calls into question the morality of readership. But, 
more importantly, Berryman’s humor locates the poem itself not simply as a source of a 
humor, but as a site of pleasure in its own right. By finding the freedom, however indirect, to 
articulate his experiences of sexual failure, Berryman is able to articulate the repressed urge 
for poetry that Henry cannot express.  
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Conclusion: No Longer “Waiting For The End” 
 Within the context of a cultural shift towards more open attitudes towards sex, 
Berryman marks a literary output that took seriously the notion that poetry’s function was not 
merely to shock its reader with vulgarities, but to use the poetic medium’s mechanisms to 
lighten the psychological and cultural burdens. Berryman did so by openly treating his life as 
a source for his poems, and attempting to represent the intensity of pleasure through a 
distinct, lyrical mode. More significantly, however, Berryman finally found humor as a way 
to articulate the burdensome topics with lightness. The humor, however, was not merely 
entertaining or pleasing, but also discomforting in a way that forces its reader to reexamine 
both the content and the act of reading. 
 Reading Berryman has been unimaginably meaningful for me because it has, in a way, 
reconnected me with an earlier state of innocence. Once, like most children and adolsecents, 
my own experience seemed to be the most important reality. I dwelled upon my life with an 
intensity that seems to have found itself translated into Berryman’s poetry, reconnecting me 
to that sense of dramatic self-indulgence. Berryman’s poetry, thankfully, has not inspired me 
to be absolutely self-important again. Rather, it has served as a reminder to live with 
intensity—to feel the world, and to articulate my experience, with passion. In a world of 
digital and ironic detachment, Berryman is a valuable (grand)father to adopt, because of his 
commitment to living and writing with an absolutely sincere vigor.   
 It is inevitable, from this point on—Berryman will remain an influence in my own 
poetry. How could it be otherwise? Berryman sought to lighten the weight of his own 
burdens, and in doing so he managed to create moving, emotional, thrilling poems. This 
study has shown me that, first and foremost, the poem is a site that welcomes risk. Rather 
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than attempt to create “poetry,” or to be a “poet,” my hope now is to fail productively. To 
understand the poem in this way is to make it an extremely exciting literary form.  
 Beyond that, this study has shown that style can be more than just an opportunity for 
experimentation. Paying close attention to the sound and movement of language can 
transform a poem into something more akin to a composition—a musical, emotional, and 
conceptual complex. Language has repercussions far beyond the poetic, extending into a 
possible effect upon the world outside of the poem as well. To be sure, this makes for another 
exciting possibility, heightening the stakes and promising the potential for a truly rewarding 
outcome.  
 But more than anything else, I find myself without a satisfactory academic conclusion, 
perhaps because the experience of writing this thesis has been far more emotional and 
personal than scholarly. With that in mind, rather than summing up this experience with a 
neatly knotted ending, my hope is that a poem will suffice: 
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John Berryman 
Sip on a cig and call 
home. Why, I oughta. Why, flowers, 
are you blooming 
in complaint, sticking out 
your necks in thirst, sickly?  
My own neck is sore 
from the bowing, 
and the curtain’s closing on. 
Well! Things end. 
No spilt milk. 
It was not  
fun while it lasted. 
Thanks a million 
for all the mosaics 
of shattered thought. 
Leave me alone, for now, 
but not forever, Songs that 
battered all night 
my head: Songs, 
made once and forgotten  
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